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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
S'l'ATE OF UTAH, by and through 
its DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND 
GAl\lE, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
UNITED GEOPHYSICAL COM-
PANY, a foreign corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
11362 
BRIEF OF RESP·ONDENTS 
EXPLANATION 
For reference purposes, respondent has marked the 
<le]Jositions Exhibits A, B, C and D and will cite the page 
in the exhibit where the fact is set forth. 
The copy of letter dated .May 9, 1963 attached to 
}llaintiff's request for admissions is not a part of the rec-
ord certified to this Court, but the parties have stipulated 
that it be filed and marked Exhibit 1. 
Defendant and Unite<l Electro Dynamics, Inc. are the 
sa111e corporation. 
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STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
1 jvl. a" t _' Exc~pt for the erroneous contention that the action 
1~, , •• , 1 ..... is based m part upon detrimental reliance on representa-
·~, : L .
1 
tions, appellant's statement of case is acceptable. Neither 
t;_,, . · 1 · detriment nor reliance nor misrepresentation is alleged 
.. •'Jr-,,., i~ .t ..h~_cori .. 1p~a.~Ft,~r/~~i~ft:3"e1l~ewcere in, ~he rec~rd. 
! •' \ J l\ .; • ;' ' ' '· . -~. ""t-/r .. c.. d .J- f ' . \ . . \. : . r ' .t ' ,.. ' . ,: ) 
! Ji.:: ·,', '~ ~;'"·: ·. 1DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT . 
~ ( C ' . ' ", ,1 • :. 'I'' 
;:.."'• •"" \ \; ~ The trial court granted the defendant's motion for 
• ,.../:..' .. ·'. ( \ a summary judgment and dismissed the action. 
~,·-
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent is satisfied with the judgment of the 
lower court and seeks to have it affirmed. 
RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant's statement is not supported by any refer-
ence to the record and to the extent that it does not coin-
cide with the following facts, is not agreed to by respond-
ent. 
The action is based on an alleged breach of defend-
ant's "assurance and guarantee to compensate the Fish 
and Game Department for the reasonable value of any 
loss sustained by the fisheries resource as the result of 
detonations of explosives in Bear Lake." (R-1). The 
damage claimed was a substantial kill of cisco, white fish 
and lake trout having an asserted value of $150,000 and a 
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$50,000 damage to the spawning area of the cisco fish. 
(R 1). 
':Che explosives were detonated by defendant for the 
pmpose of studying seismic propagation paths and re-
gional travel times in the Western United States as part 
of the VELA Uniform Program of the Advanced Re-
search Projects Agency, Department of Defense. (Ex. 1). 
Defendant was engaged by the United States Geological 
8 nrvey to make the study. (Ex. 1). 
Defendant requested permission of the Fish and 
Game Department to use Flaming Gorge Reservoir as one 
of the shot locations. It also wished to use Bear Lake. 
The request was contained in the letter dated May 9, 1963. 
(Ex. 1). Permission to make the tests was granted by a 
formal resolution of the Fish and Game Department 
adopted on May 15, 1963. (Ex. A, p. 4-5). 
rrhe explosions in Bear Lake were conducted on May 
23, and again on May 24. A representative of the Fish 
and Game Department accompanied the defendant's Proj-
Pct Manager and pointed ont the deepest water in the 
Lake. (Ex. B, p. 7.) About the same time defendant also 
detonated explosives in Flaming Gorge Reservoir, as a 
rPsult of which a number of rainbow trout were killed. 
(Ex. A, p. 10). The plaintiff makes no complaint of fish 
killed in Flaming Gorge. (R. 1). 
Admittedly a substantial number of cisco fish were 
killed by the explosions in Bear Lake. A few white fish 
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and an insignificant number of lake trout were also killed. 
(Ex. B, p. 10-13). 
Cisco fish are found only in Bear Lake and cannot be 
restocked. (Ex. A, p. 44). They are small and cannot 
be taken from the water by angling or by any kind of 
lure. (Ex. D, p. 21). They are captured by the use of 
nets and only during the spawning season when they come 
to shore. (Ex. D, p. 19). This method of taking cisco 
from the Lake is aptly designated by the Department as 
"harvesting." (Ex. D, p. 21). 
Prior to 1958 the Fish and Game Department im-
posed no restrictions upon the harvesting of cisco. Since 
then, the regulations limit the number that can be taken 
and also the size of the nets to be used. (Ex. D, p. 20). 
The open season corresponds to the spawning season. 
The latter varies somewhat with weather conditions. (Ex. 
X). 
POINTS RELIED UPON 
POINT I. 
DEFENDANT DID NOT AGREE TO PAY THE PLAIN· 
TIFF FOR FISH KILLED IN BEAR LAKE. 
POINT II. 
FISH IN BEAR LAKE ARE FERAE NATURA AND 
PLAINTIFF HAS NO PROPRIETARY INTEREST IN THEM. 
POINT III. 
THE FISHING RESOURCES OF THE STATE WERE 





DEFENDANT DID NOT AGREE TO PAY THE PLAIN-
TIFF FOR FISH KILLED IN BEAR LAKE. 
The agreement which plaintiff asserts was breached 
hy the defendant is contained in the letter dated May 9, 
J %3, addressed to the Director of the Fish and Game De-
partment and signed by the defendant's Project Manager 
and the resolution of the Department dated May 15th, 
granting permission to detonate explosives in Flaming 
Gorge and Bear Lake. There is nothing to indicate that 
this agreement was varied or added to in any particular. 
Mr. Harold Crane, the Director of the Department, con-
<lucted the negotiations leading up to the adoption of the 
resolution and his deposition will not support any claim 
that the defendant made any commitment, promise or 
representation other than set forth in the letter of May 
9. His deposition affirmatively discloses that in granting 
the permission to make the tests, the Department relied 
entirely upon the letter of May 9. It likewise discloses 
that the tests were made exactly as defendant proposed 
in the letter. Representatives of the Department were 
pn~sent when the explosives were detonated and assisted 
ddendant in locating the deepest water in the Lake. The 
t>xplosions were made on two or three different days, and 
no one made any protest before or after either explosion. 
l\fr. Crane died before the pre-trial hearing and no 
further evidence concerning extraneous promises :i\rep-
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resentations can be produced. Under familiar principlrs 
of law, all prior, oral negotiations, represc~ntations and 
promises are merged in the written agreement and evi-
dence of such extraneous matters is inadmi:::;sible, even 
if available, which it is not. See Last Chance, etc. v. 
Erickson, 82 Utah 475, 25 P.2d 952. 
Apparently there were conversations between Mr. 
Crane and representatives of defendant subsequent to foe 
resolution of the Department. However, any assurance 
made in these conversations did not go beyond those con-
tained in the letter of May 9. See Exhibit A, p. 9-10. 
Furthermore, a written obligation cannot, in the absence-, 
of fraud or mutual mistake, be enlarged by a subsequent \ 
oral promise. See Ephraim Theater vs. Hawk, 7 Utah 2d 
163, 321 P.2d 221. 
Contrary to the appellant's contention, neither the 
letter agreement of May 9 nor the resolution of the De-
partment adopted on May 15 is ambiguous, uncertain or 
unintelligible. The letter recites that it is a request for 
permission to use Flaming Gorge Reservoir as one of the 
shot locations. "We also wish to use Bear Lake." The 
site selected is at Jarvis Canyon, approximately seven 
miles upstream from the dam. This site is located in the 
Flaming Gorge Reservoir. Nothing is said about a site 
for the shot locations in Bear Lake. The testimony indi-
cates that at the time the letter of May 9 was written, de-
fendant did not know whether the shot locations in Bear 
Lake would be in Utah or in Idaho. All that was known 
then was that the shots were to be made in the deepest 
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water of the Lake. The point of deepest water was not 
known until the plaintiff's representative pointed it out 
to the defendant. 
The letter says that four or five shots would be fired 
on consecutive days. After specifying the maximum 
charge for any one shot and fixing the dates when the 
same are to be fired, the defendant "assumes responsi-
bility and any resulting liabilities entailed in the use of 
this reservoir as a shot location." 
The concluding paragraph of the letter represents 
that defendant had obtained permission from the Depart-
ment of the Interior "to use Flaming Gorge Reservoir as 
a shot location" and that any game fish killed as a result 
of these explosions would be restocked by defendant in a 
manner that is agreeable to the Utah Fish and Game De.-
partment. 
The resolution of the Department granting the re-
quested permission is likewise clear and unambiguous. It 
recites almost the exact language of the defendant's letter. 
Commissioner Nelson moved that "the Department grant 
defendant permission to use Flaming Gorge and Bear 
Lake as shot locations with the approval of the Commis-
sion." The motion "\Vas passed unanimously. 
The language of a contract is to be given its plain, 
ordinary meaning unless technical terms are used (Plain 
City, etc. v. Hooper, etc., 11 Utah 2d 188, 356 P.2d 625) 
and it is to be construed in the light of the circumstances 
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surrounding its execution. Maw v. Noble, 10 Utah ~d 440, 
354 P.2d 121. 
In this connection, it should be kept in mind that cisco 
fish are indigenous to Bear Lake and cannot be restocked. 
Neither can they be taken from the Lake by angling or by 
any form of lure. "\Vhite fish and lake trout likewise can-
not be restocked. The only method of maintaining the 
cisco, ·white fish and lake trout population of Bear LakP 
is by natural propagation. 
The only species of fish that have been domesticated 
and which can be successfully restocked is the rainbow 
trout. At the time of the explosions, Utah, Wyoming and 
the United States were in the process of stocking Flam-
ing Gorge Reservoir with several million rainbow trout. 
(Ex. A, p. 11). 
Respondent contends that the letter agreement of 
May 9, upon which the plaintiff must and does rely, does 
not bind the respondent to pay any damage or the reason-
able value of any fish killed as a result of the explosions. 
Its commitment was "the assumption of responsibility 
and resulting liabilities entailed in the use of this reser-
voir as a shot location,'' and to ''restock game fish'' 
killed by these explosions. 
The responsibilities and resulting liabilities so as-
sumed by the defendant were the responsibilities and lia-
bilities of the plaintiff which it might incur by consenting 
to the explosions. It would he meaningless for defendant 
to assume its own responsibilities and liabilities. rrlwy 
!I 
\\ 011ld n•mam with the defendant whether it expressly 
asstmu·d thc>m or not. 'fhe plain import of this provision is 
to indemnify the plaintiff against claims for personal in-
.i 11r.v and property damage. No such responsibilities or 
liabilities arose. Furthermore, the indemnification is for 
liability ''entailed by the use of this resc>rvoir" as a shot 
location. "'l1his reservoir" means Flaming Gorge because 
that is the only reservoir involved in the project or men-
tioned in the letter. 
The second aspect of defendant's obligation is as 
eh~ar as the first. After reciting that permission had been 
obtained from the federal government to use Flaming 
Oorge Reservoir as a shot location, the letter proceeds: 
"Any game fish killed as a rPsult of these explosions 
\rnuld be restocked" by defendant in a manner agreeable 
to the Department. The gist of this undertaking is re-
stocking, and the only inquiry is: ·what fish are to be 
restocked~ The arn-5wer is that it is the fish killed in Flam-
ing Gorge Resenoir because "these explosions" clearly 
mid directly refer to the explosions in Flaming Gorge. 
Those are the only fish that can be restocked and to con-
strue defendant's undertaking as a promise to restock 
fish killed in Bear Lake wonld be tantamount to constru-
ing it as a promise to do the impossible. 
A promise to do that which is impossible to do is a 
uwrP idle ceremony. If the parties were aware of the 
impossibility, the promise is not real or genuine and 
ll\'ither is the acceptance of it. They are not actually 
l1arµ;aining. 
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" ( 1) Where the existence of a specific thing or 
person is, either by the terms of a bargain or in 
the contemplation of both parties, necessary for 
the performance of a promise in the bargain, a 
duty to perform the promise 
(a) never arises if at the time the bargain 
is made the existence of the thing or 
person within the time for seasonable 
performance is impossible, and 
(b) is discharged if the thing or person sub-
sequently is not in existence in time for 
seasonable performance, 
unless a contrary intention is manifested, or the 
contributing fault of the promisor causes the 
nonexistence." Restatement, Contracts,§ 460. 
"Where the impossibility is known to both of the 
parties at the time of making the agreement, there 
can be no intention of performing it on the one 
side, and no expectation of its being performed on 
the other, and therefore one of the essentials of a 
valid promise, viz., a legal consideration, is want-
ing." 9 Cyc. 627. 
See also 17 Am. J ur. 2d, § 10, p. 345-G. 
Another surrounding circumstance which indicates 
that it was the intention of the parties to confine the de-
fendant's restocking obligation to fish killed in Flaming 
Gorge Reservoir is that an elaborate system of cages was 
installed in the reservoir to form a basis for determining 
the number of rainbow trout which might be killed. No 
such precautions were taken with respect to the explo-
sions in Bear Lake. All of these considerations point un-
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erringly to an intention to limit defendant's restocking 
obligation to a location where it could be performed. 
Plaintiff's rather devious contention that defendant's 
obligation under the letter agreement was enlarged by a 
subsequent, oral assurance made to the Department is re-
futed by Mr. Crane. After stating that "defendant's 
representative assured me that we had nothing to worry 
about in Bear Lake and if we did that they would assume 
fnll responsibility for any losses," he continued, "and, of 
course, he reiterated that they had previously stated that 
in the letter so we didn't need to be concerned." 
"Q. So that in the conversation, he reaffirmed 
what had been said in the letter of May 9, 
1963~ 
A. Yes." 
Mr. Crane further stated that there was no corres-
pondence from the defendant other than the letter of May 
9, which related to explosions in Bear Lake. (Ex. A, p. 6). 
In this state of the record, there is no basis for any claim 
that defendant's obligation set forth in the letter of May 
9 was modified, supplemented or added to by any addi-




FISH IN BEAR LAKE ARE FERAE NATURA AND 
PLAINTIFF HAS NO PROPRIETARY INTEREST IN THEl\I. 
Fish in interstate bodies of water are ferae natitra. 
No one has poss<>ssion of them and po::;session is the finst 
step toward ownership or property rights. rn1ey arP 
migratory and are actnally in the state only at intervals. 
Until they are captured they are res nullis and not a sub-
ject of ownership or property rights. It is a fiction to say 
that tlH'Y are the property of the state or of tl11:,~ people 
of the state. 
"Until actual capture has been effected no prop-
erty is acquired in the denizens of the wild. Ex-
cept by legal fiction, Oregon has not, strictly 
speaking, a proprietary right in the fish in its 
streams. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 41G, 
43-1:, 40 S. Ct. 382, 64 L. Ed. 641, 11 A.L.R. 984. 
Supervision of wild life is exercised, moreover, as 
a trust for the people of the particular state, not 
as a 'prerogative for the advantage of the govern-
ment as distinct from the people, or for the bene-
fit of private individuals as distinguished from the 
public good.' Geer v. Connecticut, l 61 U.S. 519, 
529, 16 S. Ct. 600, 604, 40 L. Ed. 793." Th01nso11 i·. 
Dana 52 F.2d 759. 
"The whole ownership theory, in fact, is now gen-
erally regarded as but a fiction PxprPssive in legal 
shorthand of the importance to its people that a 
State have power to preserve and regulate thP 
exploitation of an important resource.'' Toomer 1.:. 
lVitsell, :33-1: U.8. 385, (m 8.C't. 115G. 
''There is a real distinction and difference between 
the right of the State in its lands and personal 
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property and its rights in fish in the public waters 
of the State. In its proprietary property it has 
absolute rights. In fish in tlw pnblic waters the 
State has a sovereign right primarily and essen-
tially of preservation, conservation, and regula-
tion for the people of tlw State, whose right is to 
take fish from the public waters subject to the reg-
ulations imposed by the State for the benefit of 
the people of the State. People of the State may 
take fish from the public waters unless forbidden 
by law. They may not legally take proprietary 
property of the State unless authorized to do so 
by due course of law." State v. Stotuaniire, 179 
So. 730. 
Plaintiff bases its claim of ownership upon Section 
23-1-10, U.C.A. 1953, \vhich states that all game and fish 
now or hereafter within this state are declared to be the 
property of the state. The legislatures of most states 
have made a similar declaration. These statutes are mere 
assertions of the sovereign power of the state to control, 
proic>ct and propagate fish and game. No further force or 
dfect can be given to thc>m. Neither the state nor the 
legislature has or can create any property interest in 
migrator)' or wild animals which are here today and gone 
tomorrow. Any concept of property rights in such ani-
mals is totally unrealistic. Complete force and effect 
ean be given to these declarations by interpreting them 
as assertions of powPr to control and protect wildlife 
whenever it is within the boundaries of the state. See 
Jfis:-;ouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 41G, 64 L.E<l. 641, 40 S. c;~~ ~ 
382, 11 A.L.R. 984. :> I 0' "'1'. -
lu Crvv-vV\h-vtA-v ~ if) \ -~ :Z 3 2 a 2. o{ ' 
1.,- q 
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Since plaintiff has no proprietary interest or pro1>-
erty right in fosh in BPar Lake, tlwre is no foundation 
for any recovery of the reasonablP value of those that 
were killed and no occasion to inquire into the soundness 
of the very unique theory of damages ad\-ocated in appel-
lant's brief. 
POINT III. 
THE FISHING RESOURCES OF THE STATE WERE 
NOT DAMAGED OR INJURED BY THE EXPLOSIONS IN 
BEAR LAKE. 
The letter of May 9 discloses that defendant in-
formed the Director of the Fish and Game Department 
of the exact nature of the tests to be conducted and the 
locations where the chemicals would be detonated, also the 
maximum charge size of the shots. The Department 
made a careful investigation of the fish loss that could 
be expected to result from the explosions. The applica-
tion was considered by the Commission at a regular 
meeting called for that purpose and permission was 
granted by a formal n•solnhon adopted b:v the unanimous 
vote of the Commission. It is obvious that the Commis-
sion concluded that the tests could be conducted without 
injury to the fishing resources of the state. Subsequent 
events have clearly demonstrated that the judgment of 
the Commission in this respect has been vindicated. Fish 
were killed in both Bear Lake and Flaming Gorge Reser-
voir. The state concedPs that the fish loss in Flaming 
Gorge did not injure or damage the fishing resources of 
the reservoir. The number kill<>d were easily and readily 
restocked. 
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As to the cisco fish killed in Bear Lake, the evidence 
dis<·los<>s that the fishing resource of this Lake has actu-
ally increased and expanded since the defendant conduct-
<'U its tests. (Ex. X). Both the number of harvesters of 
cisco and the size of the harvest have actually increased 
to a very substantial degree since 1963. There is not a 
suggestion in the record that any harvester has failed to 
net his limit because of any diminution in the supply. The 
number of harvesters and the number of cisco harvested 
depends upon the length of the spawning season and 
weather conditions. Cisco population is not a factor in 
valuating the fishing resource of Bear Lake. 
More conclusive evidence that the fishing resource of 
Bear Lake has not been damaged so far as cisco are con-
c<:>rned is the fact that the Fish and Game Department 
has shipped large numbers of these fish to both California 
and Idaho since the explosions occurred. The shipments 
to California went to Lake Tahoe for the purpose of es-
tablishing a supply of forage fish for the lake trout. The 
shipments to Idaho were for experimental purposes. 
That large numbers of cisco fish in Bear Lake are 
expendable is indicated by the fact that the Department 
permits them to be harvested during their spawning 
season when, for every female cisco netted, hundreds of 
eggs are destroyed. 
There is no evidence that the loss of the few macki-
naw impaired that particular fishing resource in the lake. 
The number killed was insignificant and any los:s would 
be theoretical only and temporary. 
The white fish population of Bear Lake appears to 
be as abundant as the cisco and there is no evidence that 
any fisherman's rights have been impaired by the small 
number killed by the explosions. 
There is also a total absence of any damage or injmy 
to the spawning grounds of the cisco fish in Bear Lake. 
Plaintiff does not allege any damage to the spawning 
ground of any other fish. The chemicals were exploded 
at a depth of 160 feet and at a point almost a half mile 
from the spawning area of the cisco fish. There is no 
probability whatever that any damage to this spawning 
area could have resulted from the explosions. The spawn-
ing season had closed five months before the explosions 
occurred and an investigation of the spawning area made 
by a representative of the Department disclosed that the 
spawning area had greatly expanded after the tests "\vere 
made. (Ex. X). 
We are not suggesting that the Fish and Game De-
partment can indiscriminately authorize the use of ex-
plosives in Bear Lake. The defendant conducted these 
explosions to obtain classified information for the pro-
tection of the country in the eyent of "\Var. It was not 
taking fish and it did not request any license or privilege 
to take fish. The State of Utah, through its Fish and 
Game Department, after due deliberation, concluded that 
the tests could be made ·without impairment of the fish-
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ing resources or the rights of the public to take fish from 
t lw public water. Its judgment in that matter was correct 
and it i:-; to be commended for participating in a project 
de.signed to obtain scientific information to be used in 
defense of the country. 
SUMMARY 
Defendant's letter of May 9, 1963 and the resolution 
of the Fish and Game Commission embodies the entire 
agreement of the parties and it is not modified by any 
oral representations or assurances or by written docu-
ments. It is clear and unambiguous and obligates the 
defendant to indemnify the State against claims of lia-
hili ty for personal injuries and damage to property, and 
to restock game fish killed in Flaming Gorge Reservoir. 
There has been no breach of either of these obligations. 
The plaintiff has no proprietary interest or property 
right in the fish in Bear Lake and cannot recover any 
damage on account of fish killed as a result of the explo-
s10ns. 
Neither the fishery nor the fishing resources have 
been damaged or injured by the explosions, and the right 
of the public to take fish from Bear Lake has not been 
adversely affected or impaired. 
Fish in Bear Lake are not the subject of ownership 
or property rights and the only remedy for killing such 
fil'h is fine and/or imprisonment. 
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We respectfully submit that the judgment of the 
trial court is correct and should be affirmed. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, 
CORN\V ALL & McCARTHY 
By: Grant H. Bagley 
Clifford L. Ash ton 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Respondent 
